• Wittgenstein and Heidegger against a Science of Aesthetics

    Author(s):
    Andreas Vrahimis (see profile)
    Date:
    2020
    Group(s):
    Philosophy
    Subject(s):
    Heidegger, Martin, 1889-1976, Aesthetics, History, Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889-1951, Brentano, Franz, 1838-1917, Friends and associates
    Item Type:
    Article
    Tag(s):
    Heidegger, History of aesthetics, Ludwig Wittgenstein, School of Brentano
    Permanent URL:
    http://dx.doi.org/10.17613/h99z-xd51
    Abstract:
    Wittgenstein’s and Heidegger’s objections against the possibility of a science of aesthetics were influential on different sides of the analytic/continental divide. Heidegger’s anti-scientism leads him to an alētheic view of artworks which precedes and exceeds any possible aesthetic reduction. Wittgenstein also rejects the relevance of causal explanations, psychological or physiological, to aesthetic questions. The main aim of this paper is to compare Heidegger with Wittgenstein, showing that: (a) there are significant parallels to be drawn between Wittgenstein’s and Heidegger’s anti-scientism about aesthetics, and that (b) their anti-scientism leads both towards partly divergent criticisms of what I will call ‘aestheticism’. The divergence is mainly due to a broader metaphilosophical disagreement concerning appeals to ordinary language. Thus situating the two philosophers’ positions facilitates a possible critical dialogue between analytic and continental approaches in aesthetics.
    Metadata:
    xml
    Published as:
    Journal article     Show details
    Pub. DOI:
    10.33134/eeja.29
    Publisher:
    Helsinki University Press
    Pub. Date:
    2020-4-15
    Journal:
    Estetika: The European Journal of Aesthetics
    Volume:
    LVII/XIII
    Issue:
    1
    Page Range:
    64 - 85
    ISSN:
    2571-0915
    Status:
    Published
    Last Updated:
    3 years ago
    License:
    All Rights Reserved
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